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There is intuitive pull to the idea that if a subject knows or believes that others are just 
like her, and if she trusts herself as an epistemic agent, then she should also trust others as 
epistemic agents.  It seems that she would be inconsistent to trust herself, and then when 
faced with an identical being in a situation or environment identical to her own, not 
extend trust to that other being as well.  In this paper I argue that charges of inconsistency 
of the sort above can only apply if one’s self-trust is on the basis of reasons.  I consider 
why the intuitive consistency claim sounds right, address some possible concerns about 
my conception of inconsistency, and then go on to suggest that behavioral inconsistency 
is theoretically insignificant – it needn’t play any significant role in a theory of trust 
intended to show that other-trust requirements are not being met.  Theories wishing to 
show that there are other-trust requirements should give reasons for trust.  I conclude by 
considering an objection involving self-trust policies.
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1There is intuitive pull to the idea that if I know (or believe) that others are more or 
less like me, and if I trust myself as an epistemic agent in certain situations, then I should 
also trust others as epistemic agents in those same situations.  There is even more pull to 
the idea that if I know (or believe) that others are exactly like me and in exactly the same 
kind of situation or environment I’m in, then if I trust myself as an epistemic agent, I 
should also trust those others.  It seems that I would be inconsistent to trust myself, and 
then when faced with an identical being in a situation or environment identical to my 
own, not extend trust to that other being as well.  If I have a set of faculties that is shared 
by others, and if these faculties are responsible for the formation of my beliefs, it seems 
that something is wrong if I rely on my particular faculties but not on those same faculties 
in another subject.  If there’s no difference in the faculties, it seems that I should have to 
rely on them equally in whatever subject or subjects they may be found, all things being 
equal.
An intuitive claim:
If a subject trusts herself as an epistemic agent, then she 
must trust as epistemic agents those whom she believes to 
have epistemic faculties identical to her own (in identical 
environments)1, on pain of inconsistency.
This is a plausible principle, but as I will argue in this paper, it is not available on 
just any account of trust in one’s own faculties.  That is, the principle doesn’t hold apart 
from certain further conditions, which may or may not be met in individual cases of 
self-trust.  So, if a general account of what makes self-trust an acceptable epistemic 
practice fails to acknowledge these further conditions2, this intuitive principle will not 
1 I will tend to leave off the condition of “identical environment” in the discussion that follows.  My 
argument doesn’t hinge on anything here, and for full effect, reference to identical (or similar) 
environment may be inserted wherever there is reference to identical (or similar) faculties.
2 I take it that Foley (2001), (2005) and Zagzebski (2012) give this sort of account. That’s not to say that 
their accounts can’t be amended or clarified so that inconsistency charges can be made.
2hold without qualification on that account.  I will argue that accounts conceiving of 
self-trust as something that subjects do (or just as well may do) without taking certain 
things to be epistemic reasons to self-trust are unable to ground charges of inconsistency 
against just anyone who would withhold trust to others.
An analysis of inconsistency will be critical to showing this.  Inconsistency in 
multiple instances of one’s behavior, I will suggest, is not merely a matter of difference in 
behavior in otherwise similar situations, but rather the failure to treat something as a 
reason, when one already takes that thing to be a reason and has acted/believed on the 
basis of it.  Given this understanding of inconsistency, inconsistency charges with regards 
to other-trust can only be made against those who, in trusting themselves, take something 
to be a reason for their trust, and yet fail to treat that thing as a reason when it would 
require them to trust others.
The structure of this paper is as follows.  In the first section I examine behavioral 
inconsistency charges in general, arguing that a subject’s reasoning, i.e. taking things to 
be reasons, is the basis of such charges and that without a subject taking things to be 
reasons for belief or action there cannot be any problematic sort of inconsistency when 
different behaviors are exhibited.
While it’s necessary, if there are to be inconsistency charges, that a subject who 
withholds trust to others take herself to have reasons for her self-trust, in the second 
section I show that taking oneself to have reasons for self-trust is not a sufficient 
condition for inconsistency charges.  This is because some things which might be taken 
as reasons to trust oneself aren’t applicable as reasons to trust others, and therefore one 
can’t fail to treat those things as reasons when not extending trust to others.  These first 
two sections, then, serve to demonstrate that the possibility of behavioral inconsistency 
3requires that not just any reasons, but reasons of a certain sort be involved in self-trust.
At this point in the paper, the goal will shift away from showing the importance of 
reasoning for making inconsistency charges and towards supporting the claim that 
inconsistency is theoretically insignificant, in the sense that theorizers who wish to show 
that other-trust requirements aren’t being met by subjects have little need of the concept 
of behavioral inconsistency in their theories.  In the third section, which lays some 
groundwork for this, I suggest that the intuitive claim this paper began with sounds right 
due to a hidden assumption about the reasons why subjects’ faculties produce true beliefs, 
namely that there’s some law-like connection between the sort of faculties one has and 
the tendency for a subject to form true beliefs.  In the following section I address 
objections to the account of inconsistency briefly described above and formulate a more 
general condition of behavioral inconsistency.  This supports the point of the next section: 
inconsistency is theoretically insignificant, because there’s always something other than 
inconsistency that an inconsistent subject is doing and which is wrong.  This conclusion, 
along with the discussion of the intuitive claim with which this paper begins, is leveraged 
into a suggestion for a different approach to trust accounts which aim at requiring 
other-trust: depending on what a subject takes to be his or her reasons, withholding trust 
may not be appropriate; so, accounts should focus on giving reasons, which we can 
accept, for why we should trust (however much we should).  In other words, showing that 
trust is actually required will mean actually giving subjects reasons to trust.  I conclude 
by considering an objection involving self-trust policies.
4I. Inconsistency
Before demonstrating that charges of inconsistency don’t always apply (without 
further conditions holding) when a subject withholds trust to others whom she knows or 
believes to have faculties like her own, I will discuss how inconsistency does and does 
not work.  The sort of inconsistency we’re particularly interested in is between instances 
of trusting and withholding trust.  So, considered more generally, what we’re interest in is 
inconsistency in behavior (what I’ll sometimes call “inconsistency between instances of 
behavior” or “behavioral inconsistency”), as opposed to inconsistency between behavior 
and belief or inconsistency in sets of beliefs.  By inconsistency in behavior, then, we 
mean something that at least entails (but is not merely identical to) “in situation Y, 
sometimes doing X and sometimes not doing X.”  On it’s own, this is not a complete 
description of the inconsistency we’re concerned with, which is something that would 
somehow be problematic, something that one can be charged with.  This means we must 
be concerned with more than just behavioral variety and uniformity in otherwise identical 
circumstances.
To illustrate this point, imagine a person getting out of bed one morning, choosing 
to put her right foot forward before her left, for no (contrastive) reason.  The next 
morning, nothing relevant having changed in her situation, she chooses to put her left foot 
forward, for no (contrastive) reason.  Is our subject inconsistent because one day she gets 
out of bed with her right, and the next with her left, even though she is confronted with 
exactly the same situation on both days?  It seems clear that she is not doing anything 
wrong; there’s nothing we can charge her with.  Faced with identical situations, she chose 
different courses of action.  Her behavior exhibited variety versus uniformity, and yet she 
was not inconsistent.
5I suggest that inconsistency depends largely on the role that reasons play (or don’t 
play) in a subject’s behavior.  It’s beyond the project of this paper to give an account of 
reasons, but I will explain in broad terms how I am using the term and give a few 
examples to illustrate what I mean, though what follows is admittedly incomplete.  By 
reasons I mean things on the basis of which we should act or believe.  For example, if I 
should eat given that I am hungry, then my hunger is a reason for me to eat.  By epistemic 
reasons, I mean those things on the basis of which we should form specific beliefs.  The 
ringing of my alarm, then, would be a reason to believe that it’s morning, my great 
track-record in counting to ten a reason (perhaps) to think my counting-to-ten faculties 
are reliable.  I will also use “epistemic reason” in a derivative sense.  Something may be 
an epistemic reason to trust oneself, when this thing is an epistemic reason (in the original 
sense above) to believe that one’s faculties are accurate.  In that case, my great 
track-record counting to ten might be an epistemic reason to trust myself when I’m 
counting small numbers of objects.  By practical reasons, I mean those things on the basis 
of which we should act.  For example, if I am thirsty, my thirst is (perhaps) a reason to 
get a drink of water.  I will rely heavily on the idea that a subject can take something to 
be a reason, and I will call acting or believing on the basis of something taken to be a 
reason (either mistakenly or not) treating that thing as a reason.
To illustrate the relevance of reasons to charges of inconsistency, let’s slightly 
modify the situation we considered above: now, our subject believes her right leg is a 
little stronger than her left and that she is likely to stumble if she steps away from the bed 
with her left first.  Given this additional element, things may be different, depending on 
whether or not reasoning is involved (at least explicitly, and perhaps implicitly, as well) 
in her choice.  If our subject chooses on Day 1 to get out of bed with her right leg first 
6because she believes it’s stronger, etc., then she would be inconsistent if the next day, 
nothing having changed, she chose to get out of bed with her left.  She would be 
inconsistent on Day 2, failing to act according to what she takes to be a (conclusive) 
reason, namely the comparative strength of her right leg (and, perhaps, her beliefs/desires 
regarding the consequences of stepping out of bed with either leg).  Alternatively, we 
might say that she is failing to treat the comparative strength of her right leg as the reason 
she in fact takes it to be.  She takes her right leg’s comparative strength to be a reason to 
step with that leg first (that’s why she stepped the way she did on Day 1).  But treating 
that as a reason on Day 2 would mean stepping first again with her right leg, and so in 
failing to do so, she is failing to treat her right leg’s comparative strength as the reason 
she takes it to be.
So, it appears that inconsistency is very tightly connected to what a subject takes 
to be reasons and how she treats those things in making decisions.  In fact, inconsistency 
seems to be a bad thing because it amounts to failing to treat as a reason something that 
one thinks to be a reason.  A fuller exposition of inconsistency would consist of more 
than examples, but it’s clear that inconsistency in behavior is more than difference in 
behavior, and it’s plausible that presence or absence of reasons is relevant to the 
applicability of inconsistency charges.  Difference in behavior isn’t problematic in itself; 
ignoring or failing to do what one thinks is required of oneself in some sense or other is.  
Later, in Section IV, I’ll consider some objections to this specific conception of 
inconsistency.
7II. Trust without anything taken as an epistemic reason and charges of inconsistency
I’ll now argue that accounts which conceive of self-trust as something a subject 
does (or might as well do) without taking anything as an epistemic reason for this trust 
cannot categorically ground charges of inconsistency for withholding trust to others 
whom one knows or believes to have similar epistemic faculties.  In other words, such 
accounts cannot ground charges of inconsistency simply in virtue of self-trust and the 
withholding of trust to others who are believed or known to be similar.
If a self-trust account conceives of self-trust as something that occurs (or might as 
well occur) in the absence of anything being taken to be an epistemic reason, then on that 
account a subject trusts herself not on the basis of anything taken as an epistemic reason 
to believe she is (at least generally) a true-belief-former.3  For example, a subject not 
trusting on the basis of an epistemic reason wouldn’t be trusting herself on the basis of 
what she believes to be a good track record in forming true beliefs.
With self-trust thus restricted, we can make a distinction between two different 
sub-categories: self-trust on the basis of a practical reason, and self-trust on the basis of 
no reason at all. Accordingly, we can determine whether or not inconsistency arises, and 
with what modality, in cases of each sub-category of self-trust.  Beginning with self-trust 
on the basis of practical reasons, the key question will be whether or not practical reasons 
that are (taken to be) present for oneself are (or would be) also applicable as reasons 
when considering others as potential objects of trust.  If they are, then self-trust on the 
basis of practical reasons will be able to ground charges of inconsistency: withholding 
trust to others will amount to failing to treat as a reason something that one takes to be a 
3 Here I gloss over what would make an epistemic reason concerning one’s faculties, i.e. a reason to 
believe something about one’s faculties, a reason to trust oneself.  While it seems, for example, that 
(the belief in) the infallibility of one’s faculties would be a reason to trust those faculties, I don’t 
address this issue in this paper.
8reason and has treated as such.  If, however, practical reasons for trusting oneself aren’t 
necessarily applicable when considering others as potential objects of trust, then 
withholding trust won’t necessarily amount to inconsistency – a subject won’t necessarily 
be failing to treat as a reason what she previously took to be and treated as a reason.
In fact, practical reasons for trusting oneself are not necessarily reasons for 
trusting others.  This is clear if we imagine an example.  If a subject’s reason for trusting 
herself is to avoid skepticism, there are ways to avoid skepticism without trusting others, 
in which case the subject’s principle of skepticism-avoidance can’t be one undergirding a 
charge of inconsistency.  Once she treats skepticism-avoidance as a reason to trust 
herself, skepticism can be avoided, making skepticism-avoidance no longer applicable as 
a reason to trust others4, and then the subject needn’t be failing, in withholding trust to 
others, to treat skepticism-avoidance as the reason she takes it to be and previously 
treated it as.
So, not all practical reasons are sufficient for inconsistency, but that fact doesn’t 
prevent some practical reasons from being sufficient.  A couple of examples will serve to 
demonstrate that some practical reasons can be sufficient for grounding inconsistency 
charges.  If, say, a subject’s (conclusive) reason for trusting herself is to contribute to her 
goal of maximizing trust as a general phenomenon in the world (odd, yes, but not 
incoherent), then it would be inconsistent for her to trust herself for this reason and yet 
upon encountering another possible object of trust to fail to trust (barring other relevant 
considerations).  Similarly, if a subject trusted herself because she wanted to advance in 
her career, it’s likely that withholding trust to others would be inconsistent with her 
4 It is possible that a subject could continue to take the principle of skepticism-avoidance as a reason 
(and not be confused; she might believe, say, that there could come a time when having beliefs formed 
on the basis of trust in others would be necessary for avoiding skepticism), but it certainly isn’t 
something that one necessarily will have to continue taking as a reason.
9self-trust.  If career advancement is a (conclusive) reason for self-trust, then in most cases 
it will be a reason to trust others (at least to some extent), and so withholding trust to 
others would constitute a failure on the subject’s part to treat something (career 
advancement) as the reason she takes it to be and previously treated it to be.
The second way, we said above, that a subject may trust herself (given the absence 
of anything being taken to be an epistemic reason) is in the absence of anything at all 
being taken to be a reason, epistemic or practical.  In this case, given the preceding 
argument about the necessity of reasons, it’s immediately clear that there can be no 
charge of inconsistency: if one trusts herself for no reason, she can’t fail to take into 
account something she both takes to be a reason and previously treated to be a reason 
when faced with other potential objects of trust.
It turns out, then, if we’re not considering the possibility of trust on the basis of 
something taken to be an epistemic reason, that charges of inconsistency can be made 
only contingently, depending on the practical reasons, if any, that one has for trusting 
oneself.  This means that sometimes, and perhaps even often, charges of inconsistency 
will be appropriate.  However, since the only reasons we’re allowing a subject (for now) 
to take herself to have for self-trust are practical reasons, inconsistency will be dependent 
on the presence of practical reasons, and that doesn’t seem to do justice to the intuitive 
claim at the beginning of this paper.
The intuitive claim we began with doesn’t reference reasons of any sort, and 
intuitively it seems like we shouldn’t have to reference reasons.  The next section will 
concern why the intuitive claim sounds right, and this explanation will be useful when 
focus of this paper turns to the questions of inconsistency’s theoretical importance and of 
how theorizers interested in requiring self- and/or other-trust might go about doing so.  
10
After I argue that inconsistency is relatively insignificant in terms of showing that 
other-trust requirements aren’t being met, I’ll suggest that the best way to require trust is 
to try and give reasons for thinking that human faculties can be regularly accurate.  The 
results of the examining the intuitive claim we began with will support this suggestion.
III. The intuitive claim
The intuitive claim this paper began with might be pressed as follows: if what is 
responsible for my belief is just like what is responsible for your belief, I can’t think that 
my belief is somehow better off than yours.  And that point doesn’t depend, an objector 
might add, on whether or not self-trust is on the basis of any reasons.  This sounds 
reasonable, and I think there is a common and, in this case, hidden notion that is 
motivating this reasoning.  This notion is that there is some feature or something about 
what is responsible for my belief that explains why it produces the beliefs it does.  In 
other words, there’s a reason why my beliefs are the way they are, and this involves the 
properties and characteristics of the faculties from which they issue.  Such a notion 
makes the intuitive reasoning above sound reasonable: if my faculties produce beliefs in 
the way they do because of the way they are, then if your faculties are the same as mine 
(and in the same situation), they will produce beliefs just like mine do, and if that’s the 
case, I can’t think that your faculties, ceteris paribus, produce different beliefs than mine 
do.
At this point, though, all that we’ve said about inconsistency still blocks charges 
of inconsistency for not extending trust: if I don’t rely on my faculties for any reason, 
then I’m not inconsistent by withholding trust to others.  What bears remarking on here is 
that this is the case even if I think that my faculties would produce the same beliefs that 
11
yours are producing if I were in your situation (given, still, that I don’t trust my faculties 
for some reason).  This is because, there being no reason involved, my self-trust amounts 
to taking the actual output of my faculties as accurate, but it doesn’t require me to take 
any stand on my faculties’ potential output.  This is certainly a counter-intuitive idea and 
we would think someone odd for behaving this way, but it’s not incoherent.  If I don’t 
believe there’s a reason why my faculties get it right (such as some law-like connection 
between my faculties’ properties and their accuracy), nor therefore that there’s a reason 
why my faculties in some non-actual situation would get it right, then I’m not obviously 
committed to taking any stand, one way or the other, on my faculties’ potential output or 
the output of faculties with the same characteristics as mine.  So, while it seems strange 
to say that a subject can acknowledge that another’s beliefs are the same as those that her 
own faculties would yield, and yet withhold trust, this needn’t be problematic if both 1) 
my trust is not on the basis of a relevant reason, and 2) I don’t hold a relevant belief about 
the nature or cause of the accuracy of my faculties in producing beliefs.
This discussion, suggests, then, that somewhere behind the intuitive claim we 
began with is the assumption that there is a law-like connection between the character of 
a subject’s faculties and their accuracy.  Of course, if the assumption isn’t the assumption 
or belief of the subject to whom the inconsistency claim is being applied, but is rather an 
assumption of a third party (another subject, perhaps, who is making the charge of 
inconsistency), then the intuitive claim will not in fact apply.  On the other hand, if the 
assumption is the self-trusting subject’s, then there may be something wrong with 
withholding trust.
One of the uses of this section is that it helps us see why the intuitive claim at the 
beginning of this paper sounds right.  Additionally, the results of this section will lend 
12
support to the suggestion I will make at the end of the paper: the way to require self- and 
other-trust isn’t by relying on inconsistency charges, but by offering reasons to think 
human faculties are regularly accurate, such reasons that we in fact will accept while all 
the while admitting that we are using these very faculties in finding, offering, and 
accepting reasons.  If a subject believes that there is a law-like connection between the 
operation of human faculties in certain situations and the accuracy of the beliefs that 
result, and if as a result she is doing something wrong if she doesn’t extend trust to 
bearers of human faculties, then perhaps the way to show that other-trust is required is to 
make it required by finding, offering, and accepting reasons to rely on human faculties.
At this point it will be useful to look at some objections centered on my 
conception of inconsistency.  Addressing objections will lend support to my position, and 
it will also bring us close to an important intermediate point that supports my suggestion 
that the best way to show that other-trust is required involves finding and giving reasons 
to rely on human faculties.  This intermediate point is that inconsistency between 
instances of behavior is relatively theoretically insignificant.  Looking at objections to my 
conception of inconsistency will require refining the conception, and this in turn will be 
useful in later highlighting the fact that behavioral inconsistency’s wrongness derives 
from something other than the inconsistency itself.  And because what it’s derivative 
from, as we’ll see more starkly in this section, are certain facts about a subject’s treatment 
(or non-treatment) of things as reasons, I’ll argue in Section V that behavioral 
inconsistency is theoretically insignificant.
13
IV. Other conceptions of inconsistency
If the account of inconsistency I’ve suggested above fails to describe certain cases 
that we think are cases of behavioral inconsistency, that’s a strike against the account and, 
by extension, a strike against what I’ve said about the relation between self-trust, other-
trust, and inconsistency.  One might wonder if there aren’t cases of inconsistency where, 
contra my account, a subject isn’t failing to treat as a reason what she takes to be reason.  
I’ll now consider two kinds of cases which are at least initially plausible as cases of 
inconsistency.  The two kinds of cases each involve instances of dissimilar behavior in 
otherwise similar situations, but in neither kind of case is the inconsistent behavior an 
instance of a subject not treating as a reason what she takes to be a reason.
One kind of case: instead of a subject in the first instance of behavior treating as a 
reason what she takes to be a reason and then in the second instance failing to treat that 
same thing as the reason she takes it to be, in the first instance of behavior she fails to 
treat as a reason what she takes to be a reason, and then in the second instance of 
behavior she treats as a reason that thing she takes to be a reason (but previously failed to 
treat as such).  For example, we might think a person inconsistent who, after eating a 
bucket of fried chicken, goes out of her way to prepare something healthy for her dinner 
guests, because, say, healthy food is the best option when one can afford it.  In the first 
instance, the subject fails to treat as a reason what she takes to be a reason, and in the 
second she does treat as a reason what she takes to be a reason.
When we look at the first instance of behavior in this case, we can’t say that the 
subject is inconsistent, as there isn’t any other instance of behavior yet for it to be 
inconsistent with (again, the sort of inconsistency we’ve been concerned with is 
inconsistency between different instances of behavior).  If we had seen the subject of our 
14
example finishing off a drumstick before beginning to plan for her guests the next day, 
we wouldn’t think her behavior of inconsistent with something else she’d done.  As for 
the second instance of behavior, it isn’t a case of the subject failing to treat as a reason 
that which she in fact takes to be a reason, because as we’ve described this kind of case, 
the second act is when the agent does treat as a reason that thing that she takes to be a 
reason.  So, on my account of inconsistency, the subject is inconsistent neither in the first 
instance of behavior, nor in the second instance.  And, yet, such cases are plausibly cases 
of inconsistency.
There are multiple ways I can respond.  First, it’s not clear that this actually is a 
case of inconsistency.  When a subject fails to treat as a reason what she takes to be a 
reason, but then later does treat it as the reason she takes it to be, in that second instance 
of behavior it doesn’t seem like she’s doing something wrong.  And if being inconsistent 
entails doing something wrong, then the agent isn’t being inconsistent.
Second, I can concede with little cost that what consideration of these sorts of 
cases shows is that a charge of inconsistency needn’t be necessarily applicable at the time 
of an instance of behavior.  I am inclined to think this isn’t correct, but, if it is correct, it 
hardly affects anything I’ve said.  Rather, it would make these sorts of case 
straightforwardly fit my account of inconsistency, with a slight modification: an 
inconsistent subject fails to treat as a reason what she takes to be a reason, and at some 
point (though, not necessarily a point in the past) she does treat that thing as the reason 
she takes it to be.  So, the subject in such a case would on my account be inconsistent in 
the first instance of behavior, as it is an instance of failing to treat as a reason something 
that she takes to be a reason (and which at a later time she does treat as the reason she 
takes it to be).
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Similarly, I can concede with little cost that what consideration of these sorts of 
cases shows is that inconsistency needn’t be understood as attributable to a single action.  
Instead, perhaps inconsistency can be something that a subject engages in across or in 
multiple instances of behavior.  This isn’t simply to restate the sort of inconsistency that 
we’re interested in – inconsistency between instances of behavior. Nor is it merely to say 
that one engages in inconsistency (partially) in virtue of engaging in multiple instances of 
behavior, though this would be correct on this concession.  Rather, it’s to say that 
inconsistency is predicable of a set of instances of behavior a subject engages in.  If 
nothing I’ve said has depended on inconsistency being attributable to a single action, then 
this concession doesn’t hurt my position, and it costs only a slight modification: a set of 
instances of behavior is inconsistent when an agent in one instance treats as a reason what 
she takes to be a reason and in another instance (we’ll say either before or after), she fails 
to treat that reason as the reason she takes it to be.  It’s still the case that no reasons 
means no inconsistency, and the heart of the inconsistency is still failure to treat as a 
reason what one takes to be a reason.
Another sort of case: a subject 1) treats as a reason what she takes to be a reason 
(let’s call that thing X), 2) at another point, either before or after, she doesn’t treat X as a 
reason, but 3) neither does she then take X to be a reason; however, 4) the change in what 
she takes to be a reason isn’t justified.  This sort of case would look similar to cases of 
inconsistency such as have so far been considered, but what’s crucially missing is the 
subject taking some one thing in both instances of behavior to be a reason.  What might 
such a case look like?  Generally, we might think of such cases as ones in which an 
subject exhibits instability with respect to what she takes to be reasons.  This is what the 
fourth condition above is supposed to capture: what one takes to be a reason changes 
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unjustifiedly.  As an example, then, we might imagine a subject who one summer takes 
(and treats) high transatlantic ticket prices as a reason to stay home over the summer, and 
then the following summer, without thinking about and/or coming to learn something 
relevant, no longer takes high ticket prices to be a reason and takes a trip to London.  This 
sort of case, though, isn’t limited to instances in which the subject unjustifiedly “loses” a 
reason.  A subject might, instead, unjustifiedly “gain” a reason.  She could, one summer, 
not take (and not treat) high transatlantic ticket prices as a reason to stay home, instead 
buying tickets and taking a trip to London, but then the next summer refuse to fly 
anywhere, now taking high ticket prices as a reason to stay home, even though she hasn’t 
thought about and/or come to learn anything relevant about what she had taken to be her 
reasons.5
It’s at least initially plausible that such a subject is behaving inconsistently.  Yet, 
as she is not failing to treat as a reason what she takes to be a reason, my account of 
inconsistency doesn’t describe this sort of case as one of inconsistency.  There’s a way of 
modifying my account to make it more accommodating of alternative and/or broader 
conceptions of inconsistency.6  The basis of this is a common element that the second 
kind of case considered above shares with cases of inconsistency as I’ve conceived of it, 
and that’s that (at some point) the subject is failing to appropriately treat (or not to treat) 
something as a reason.  The disjunction here is necessary, since the second sort of 
inconsistency case just considered allows that one might unjustifiedly begin to take 
5 A similar sort of case, which I won’t go into in this paper, is one in which the change in what the 
subject takes her reasons to be isn’t unjustified, but in which what the subject initially takes and/or 
doesn’t take to be her reasons is unjustified.  I suspect that these sorts of cases will be harder to 
characterize as cases of inconsistency.
6 I’m inclined to think that these cases aren’t really cases of inconsistency between instances of behavior, 
what’s wrong really being the instability/unjustifiedness of what the subject takes to be her reasons.  
I’ll set this aside, though.
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something as a reason.  If we allow that a subject is failing to appropriately treat (or not 
treat) something as a reason partly in virtue of her unjustifiedly taking (or not taking) that 
thing to be a reason7, then in the second sort of inconsistency considered above, the 
subject is failing to appropriately treat (or not treat) something as a reason.
In cases of inconsistency as I’ve conceived of it, the subject isn’t treating as a 
reason what she takes to be a reason.  In the most recent class of cases, the subject either 
1) isn’t treating as a reason something that, unjustifiedly, she no longer takes to be a 
reason, or 2) is treating as a reason something which, unjustifiedly, she has come to take 
to be a reason.  In any of these cases, the subject isn’t appropriately treating things that 
she can take to be reasons.  However, there’s no problem if we don’t think that there’s a 
real common element between the two sorts of inconsistency.  It’s enough for later 
purposes that in the first sort of case, a subject isn’t treating as a reason what she takes to 
be a reason, and in the latter sort, a subject changes what she takes or doesn’t take to be 
reasons unjustifiedly.  We can allow a disjunctive necessary condition for inconsistency, 
though I’ll continue as if there is a true common element in all cases of inconsistency.
So, taking into account the objections and responses above: if a subject is 
inconsistent (with respect to multiple instances of behavior), then in one of those 
instances she is not appropriately treating something which she can take to be a reason.  
This is a necessary condition for inconsistency, though (it would seem) not a sufficient 
one.  That it’s a relatively contentless condition makes it flexible: if inconsistency (or, 
7 I realize that this would be a substantive claim.  Furthermore, it raises the question of whether any 
treatment of unjustified reasons is appropriate.  It would seem that one is doing something wrong in not 
treating an unjustified reason as a reason, but here I’m also suggesting that one is doing something 
wrong in treating an unjustified reason as a reason.  As I note later in the text, though, it’s not 
ultimately important that I be able to characterize all cases of inconsistency in one way, so long as for 
any given case of inconsistency a simpler “bad” element can be identified.  So, I can allow that the 
treatment of reasons in these “instability of reasons” cases of inconsistency isn’t bad, but the 
unjustified change is.
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perhaps, the sort of inconsistency we’re interested in) involves in a particular way 
reasons, or the treatment of reasons, or changes in reasons, then that can be used to give 
content to the “appropriateness” part of the condition.  So, what’s inappropriate in an 
inconsistent subject’s treatment of reasons may depend on whether she takes something 
to be a reason, for example, or it may depend on why she takes something to be a reason, 
or it may depend on when she takes something to be a reason.
Responding to possible objections has left us with a pared down condition for 
inconsistency, and this condition centers on a subject’s treatment of what she takes (or at 
least could take) to be her reasons.  In the next section, I will argue that inconsistency 
between instances of behavior is theoretically insignificant, in the sense that 
inconsistency needn’t have a role in trust theories.  The pared down condition developed 
here will be useful, as it is not a sufficient condition.  This means that it cannot be 
constitutive of inconsistency, and because this non-constitutive condition of inconsistency 
is itself a failure for the subject, whenever there is inconsistency there will be something 
other than inconsistency which is itself bad.
V. The theoretical insignificance of inconsistency
If we want a theory of why subjects must trust others, there’s reason to suspect 
that inconsistency needn’t play an important role in such a theory, and this stems from the 
analysis of inconsistency initially developed earlier in the paper and further developed in 
the last section.  Given the analysis of inconsistency developed here, in cases of 
inconsistency there will always be a failure to appropriately treat (or not treat) something 
as a reason.  What exactly makes treatment or non-treatment appropriate will depend on 
the precise sort of behavioral inconsistency that we’re considering, but whatever sort that 
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is, it’s still the case that there’s a failure.  Crucially, this failure isn’t a sufficient condition 
for inconsistency between instances of behavior, as the condition we’ve developed 
doesn’t require that there be multiple instances of behavior.  Because it’s not a sufficient 
condition, the condition itself must be something other than inconsistency; inconsistency 
doesn’t simply amount to failing to treat (or not treat) appropriately something that can be 
taken as a reason.  
For each of the sorts of behavioral inconsistency considered above, we can 
describe an analogous kind of case where one fails to appropriately treat (or not treat) 
something as a reason, but in which there is no other instance of behavior in otherwise 
similar circumstances to make it inconsistency.  And, yet, this analogous sort of case 
would still be bad; the subject would still be doing something wrong.
Let’s rework some previous examples to see this.  Joan slightly injured her right 
leg, and the very first time she has to get out bed since injuring her leg, even though she 
takes her slight injury as a (conclusive) reason to get out with her left leg first, she 
decides to get out of bed with her right leg first instead.  The next day her legs feel 
equally strong, and so she never is faced with the same choice.  Joel wants to go to 
London, and while initially he thinks nothing of the high ticket prices, for no good reason 
his view of the ticket prices changes, he takes the high ticket prices as a reason to skip the 
trip, and he decides to stay home for the summer.  Or: Joel doesn’t want to go to London.  
Apart from not wanting to go to London, he takes high ticket prices as a reason not to go 
London.  Then, for no good reason, his view of high ticket prices changes, and when he 
later desires to go to London, he buys his tickets.8  In all three of these examples, we have 
8 It may not be possible to “subtract” an instance of behavior and reformulate cases of behavioral 
inconsistency (of the “instability of reasons” sort) where a subject in the first instance takes something 
to be a reason and that (putative) reason is such that it is necessarily treated as such.  An example of the 
sort of case I have in mind: a subject takes high ticket prices as a reason not to buy tickets, and so 
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one instance of behavior, to which a second instance could be added to give us 
inconsistency between instances of behavior, but which are on their own cases of subjects 
doing something wrong.
This result suggests that inconsistency is theoretically insignificant, because 
whenever there’s behavioral inconsistency, the subject is doing something non-identical 
with inconsistency (but which is related to the inconsistency) and which is itself 
something wrong.  If there’s always something else that one is doing wrong when 
engaging in behavioral inconsistency, then maybe the theory needn’t focus on 
inconsistency.  If the theory can work with simply the failure to appropriately treat (or not 
treat) certain things as reasons, then inconsistency is theoretically insignificant.
The sort of inconsistency and the sort of theory this paper is concerned with have 
to do with self-trust and other-trust.  There’s good reason to think that theories concerned 
with trust, and particularly concerned with showing that subjects are required to extend 
trust to others, could work just as well by focusing simply on an inconsistent subject’s 
failure to appropriately treat (or not treat) certain things as reasons.  We can see this by 
considering what cases of inconsistency would look like and how a theory that wasn’t 
concerned with inconsistency would deal with them.
The sort of cases of behavioral inconsistency involving self- and other-trust will 
generally look as follows: a subject trusts herself, and when confronted with another 
subject who she believes to have similar faculties and to be in a similar environment, she 
does not extend trust.  We know that reasons have to be involved somewhere, and there 
simply in virtue of not buying tickets she is engaging in what I have called an “instance of behavior”.  
As a consequence, a later change in behavior accompanying a later unjustified change in what one 
takes to be a reason will necessarily be a second instance of behavior.  This isn’t a problem for me, 
since it will still be the case that part of what constitutes the inconsistency will, considered on its own, 
be something bad for the subject.  
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are three options: 1) the subject takes herself to have a reason to trust herself, and also 
takes herself to have reason to trust the other subject; 2) the subject takes herself to have 
reason to trust herself, but no longer takes herself to have this reason (i.e. “loses the 
reason”) when faced with the second subject; and 3) the subject doesn’t take herself to 
have reason to trust herself, but when faced with the second subject does take herself to 
have reason to not trust.  There are only these three options, as the self-truster either takes 
herself to have a reason for self-trust (in which case she can retain or lose this), or she 
doesn’t take herself to have a reason (in which case she either “gains” a reason or 
continues to take herself to have no reason to trust).  If the agent never takes herself to 
have a reason, inconsistency can’t be at play, leaving the three possibilities.
We can see in each of these three possibilities that there is something the subject is 
doing wrong, which is more basic than the inconsistency.  In case 1, the subject takes 
herself to have a reason to trust the second subject, yet she withholds trust; in case 2, the 
subject unjustifiedly ceases to take herself to have a reason to trust when faced with the 
second subject (and doesn’t treat this thing as a reason); and in case 3 the subject 
unjustifiedly begins to take herself to have a reason to withhold trust when faced with the 
second subject (and does treat this thing as a reason in withholding trust).
All this strongly suggests that a theory to require other-trust needn’t reference 
inconsistency.  A subject is doing something wrong in failing to appropriately treat (or not 
treat) something as a reason, and inconsistency is dependent on this failing.  Focusing on 
this failing is sufficient for generating charges against withholders or self-trust, so long as 
subjects take themselves to have reasons.
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VI.  Prelude to a conclusion
The preceding discussion has shown three things: 1) without a subject taking 
herself to have certain reasons, her self-trusting doesn’t imply a consistency requirement 
to extend trust to others, because 2) reasons are central to inconsistency charges; and 3) 
since reasons are central to inconsistency charges, inconsistency in fact isn’t all that 
important for theories that would require other-trust.  Inconsistency shouldn’t be relied on 
to require other-trust, and in this final section I’d like to suggest a way of refocusing 
efforts to require other-trust. 
This paper began with an intuitive claim, and if we can preserve it (though 
perhaps not its seemingly straightforward logic), it’s worth seeing how we might do that.  
Inconsistency isn’t all that important, but reasons appear to be, or at least what we take to 
be our reasons.  I’d like to suggest a reason-centered approach for developing accounts 
which require other-trust: if one wants extending trust to be required of epistemic agents, 
then she should develop an account which gives reasons for thinking that epistemic 
faculties tend to produce true beliefs.  As we saw in our discussion of why the intuitive 
claim at the beginning of this paper sounds right, the idea that the character of one’s 
faculties and environment is responsible for the accuracy of beliefs produced can make 
the intuitive claim work.  So, if an account of why human faculties get it right can tie 
their character and the character of the environment in which they operate to the accuracy 
of the beliefs they produce, then those who accept the account will be required to trust 
others (and themselves).
Something to note, though, is that if a subject accepts an account of why her 
faculties are largely accurate, she’ll be doing something wrong if she fails to trust, 
regardless of whether or not she takes herself to have a reason to trust.  It would seem 
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that, if she believes that human faculties are such as to produce true beliefs in certain 
environments, withholding trust would be wrong on that account.9  An account of a 
theorizer seeking to require other-trust, then, ought to describe the law-like connections 
between various human faculties and the various situations those with human faculties 
find themselves in on the one hand, and the various levels of accuracy of beliefs produced 
in these different situations on the other.
If what I’ve said up till now is correct, then the way to require other-trust is to 
give reasons for it.  There’s no easy way for requirements to be spontaneously generated, 
so to speak; what a subject believes does seem to be relevant.  This means that, if 
someone wants there to be requirements, the way forward is to affect what subjects 
believe – and that’s a matter of giving them reasons to think that humans are generally 
well equipped in their environments for getting things right.
VII. A concluding objection
I’d like to close by considering a two-part objection.  The first part claims that my 
conception of theoretical (in)significance needs to be developed to allow for an ignored 
sort of theoretical significance, and the second part of the objection claims that, given this 
development, a plausible view about self-trust policies provides an example of how 
inconsistency may be theoretically significant.
One may concede that inconsistency is theoretically insignificant insofar as 
something other than inconsistency can always be charged of an inconsistent subject, 
while also thinking that it is theoretically significant in a compatible way.  A 
9 I’m taking it for granted that someone who believes that he is in a situation in which his beliefs are 
(probably) true (or would be true if he didn’t suspend belief), but who withholds trust from himself and 
thereby ceases or never begins to so believe, is doing something wrong.  This is a substantive issue that 
I set aside.
24
phenomenon, the thought goes, can be theoretically significant if reference to the 
phenomenon is (at least sometimes) necessary to showing that something other than that 
phenomenon obtains, and if the theory is supposed to describe this other something.  
Such a phenomenon is necessary for the theory to do something else which the theorizer 
desires the theory to do, and so the phenomenon is theoretically significant.  If trust 
theories, then, are supposed to explain how other-trust can be required and in fact is 
required, inconsistency will be theoretically significant if reference to both self-trust and 
the withholding of other-trust is necessary for showing that there are requirements to 
other-trust which are not being met.
With this sense of theoretical significance in hand, the second part of the objection 
seeks to show how reference to inconsistency may be necessary for showing subjects’ 
failure to meet actual other-trust requirements.  One might think that self-trust isn’t 
merely an activity that subjects engage in when they do engage in it – subjects have 
policies to self-trust10.  One might further think that if a subject has a policy to self-trust, 
then she implicitly takes some stance regarding reasons.  According to the objection, 
then, this stance (which I will take to be an implicit belief) results in requirements to have 
a policy to similarly trust others, and so in some cases only by referring to the policy to 
self-trust can it be shown that a subject who fails to hold a similar other-trust policy is 
doing something wrong.
In response, I’m glad to concede the point of the first half of the objection.  If 
inconsistency must be referenced to show that trust requirements apply and aren’t met, 
then inconsistency has a place in a trust theory.  The second half of the objection, 
10 Thanks to Stan Husi and Edward Hinchman for, in various ways, providing the basis of this second part 
of the objection, and to the latter for pushing me on my more basic insignificance claim, leading to the 
first part of the objection.
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however, fails to show that inconsistency is theoretically significant in such a way to 
outweigh theoretical insignificance.  I’ll consider two ways in which reasons might be 
implicit in a subject’s having a policy to trust, and I’ll argue that on either understanding 
of implicit reasons, inconsistency is theoretically insignificant, such that any significance 
is outweighed.
First, one might think that if a subject has the policy of trusting herself, then in 
virtue of holding this policy, she must also think there exists a reason why this policy is 
appropriate.  This implicit stance or belief regards merely the existence of a reason, not 
the character or “content” of any such reason.  The lack of a parallel policy to trust others 
would then result in inconsistency (or something very similar to inconsistency as I’ve 
analyzed it): the subject takes there to be a reason to have a policy to trust herself, so 
she’s failing to treat as existing what she takes to exist (namely, a reason to have a policy 
to trust) in failing to form a policy to trust those similar to herself.
There are two main problems with this.  First, the existence of some reason or 
other for a policy would seem to leave open the possibility (given what the subject 
believes, that is) of the unspecified reason being a practical reason, and as argued earlier, 
practical reasons aren’t necessarily re-applicable in multiple cases.  If a subject desires to 
avoid skepticism, for example, a policy to trust herself may be necessary for avoiding 
skepticism, but it’s not clear that a policy to trust others in general is necessary to avoid 
skepticism.  The way a subject treats herself can have an effect that her treating others in 
that same way doesn’t have, and as a result, practical reasons for self-trust policies won’t 
necessarily be re-applicable with regards to other-trust policies.
 A second problem with this proposal is that, even if we set aside this first issue 
and limit the sort of reason that the subject implicitly takes to exist to epistemic reasons, 
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inconsistency will still turn out to be theoretically insignificant.  For the sake of argument 
(at least), let’s conceive of the putative reasons the subject implicitly takes to exist as 
being epistemic reasons: when a subject has a policy to self-trust, she implicitly takes 
there to be some epistemic reason to have a policy to trust herself.  The question, then, is 
whether or not the implicit belief in (the existence of) an epistemic reason will be 
sufficient to generate inconsistency charges.
It would seem that for a subject to be failing to appropriately treat a putative 
reason as existing, she would have to think that the reason also exists when she is faced 
with the opportunity to have an other-trust policy.  Or, since the existence belief is 
supposed to be implicit in the case of her self-trust policy, we may prefer to think that 1) 
at the very least the subject must believe, when faced other-trust opportunities, that 
certain conditions obtain with regards to another’s faculties and environment, and 2) in 
addition to this belief in these conditions, it must also be the case that these conditions are 
somehow relevant.  However, as the subject believes merely in the existence of a reason, 
there are no relevant conditions (with one exception, as I’ll argue below).  In other words, 
because the subject doesn’t (implicitly) believe about any particular feature or set of 
features X of her faculties or environment that they provide a reason to have a policy to 
self-trust (by hypothesis), no feature or set of features of another subject’s faculties or 
environment can be relevant.
At best, then, only if a subject takes another subject’s faculties and environment to 
be identical (and not merely similar or very similar or nearly identical), will there be any 
relevance and therefore inconsistency.11  If the second subject has identical faculties in an 
11 I say “at best” because I’m not sure that any requirements arise without reflection on the subject’s part 
when it’s mere existence of a reason that a subject believes in.
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identical environment, then, whatever the putative reason could be which is (implicitly) 
taken to exist for the first subject, that putative reason would also be present in the case of 
the second subject.  There can be no relevant differences, because there are no 
differences, and because some reason is taken to exist and there are no relevant 
differences, the reason must hold in the second as well as the first case.
One might object that implicit reasons in holding a policy are necessarily 
generalizable.  However, in the analysis above, reasons are generalizable: what a subject 
implicitly takes to be a reason, involving faculties X and environment Y (and resultant 
accuracy), is such that it applies to any subject with faculties X in environment Y.  This is 
what would, if what I said above is correct, make identical faculties and identical 
environments sufficient for inconsistency charges in cases of failing to form an 
other-trust policy.  However, if an objector wants there to be generalizability that extends 
beyond the subject’s specific sorts of faculty and environment, it’s not clear why such 
generalizability is necessary.  It’s not clear, in other words, why a subject’s implicit 
putative reason must be generalizable beyond situations in which a subject has faculties X 
in environment Y.  After all, the subject with the self-trust policy implicitly takes there to 
be a reason for her policy to trust herself.  This reason, then, should relate her (sort of) 
situation to her accuracy (assuming we’re dealing with an epistemic reason).  But it’s not 
obvious why such a reason should also relate (sorts of) situations different from her own 
to accuracy of beliefs.
If we take it that identical faculties and identical environments are almost never 
believed to exist by subjects, then inconsistency will in fact play very little role in a trust 
theory that is supposed to show actual other-trust requirements.  This is another sort of 
theoretical insignificance, and so, while “in theory” reference to inconsistency may be 
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necessary to show wrongdoing, the sort of case in which inconsistency would need to be 
referenced would be too low to make the concept very useful.
This discussion may suggest a second way one might think reasons may be 
implicit in policy holding.  Instead of a policy-holding subject implicitly taking some 
reason or other to exist for her to hold her policy, we might think that a policy-holding 
subject implicitly takes some particular (putative) reason X to exist.  In other words, the 
subject implicitly believes about some features or set of features X of her faculties and 
environment provide a reason to have a policy of self-trust.  This way of understanding a 
subject’s implicit belief would block my theoretical insignificance response, as some 
particular feature or set of features of a subject’s faculties and environment may be shared 
by other subjects’ faculties and environment much more easily than all the features of a 
subject’s faculties and environment.
This view about implicit beliefs seems plausible if we take our subject to have 
certain background beliefs not implicitly arising out of her self-trust policy, e.g. 
background beliefs about brains, favorable conditions, etc.  In that case, though, it may be 
that our subject is guilty of some other failure if she fails to trust (either herself or others), 
given these background beliefs.  However, if these background beliefs are insufficient on 
their own to generate some requirement, then this may be a way for policies to generate 
other-trust requirements.  On the other hand, if our subject doesn’t have any (relevant) 
background beliefs, then it seems somewhat mysterious how it might be that a subject 
implicitly takes X to be a reason, and equally mysterious why it is that the subject takes X 
versus Y or Z to be a reason.
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